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RESTORING JUSTICE: LESSONS FROM TRUTH AND
RECONCILIATION IN SOUTH AFRICA AND RWANDA
EMILY B. MAWHINNEY1
INTRODUCTION
The nature of conflict has undergone a transformation in the
st
21 century. As a result, the methods and strategies of conflict
resolution have also been challenged to transform to meet the needs
of those affected by conflict. Interstate conflict, in which two
countries go to war with each other using conventional military force,
is no longer common because of the oversight and intervention of
international and regional organizations, and third party states. 2 A
new type of conflict has emerged in the vacuum of interstate conflict
that poses a serious challenge to traditional approaches to conflict
resolution based on third-party intervention.3 Intrastate conflict, or
civil conflict, is distinct from interstate conflict in several ways that
have significant implications for the management and resolution of
such conflict.4 Intrastate conflict often involves non-state actors
armed with unconventional weapons and amorphous ideological or
ethno-political motives.5 Because intrastate conflict is so complex,
it is ill suited for effective management by traditional third-party
intervention in the form of state-to-state diplomacy or humanitarian

1

Juris Doctor Expected May 2015, Hamline University School of Law. Special
thanks to Craig Swanson, Jack Mawhinney, and Sharon Press for their unwavering
support. This article is dedicated to Hanne B. Mawhinney, an inspiring scholar,
dedicated mentor, and eternal optimist who always believed in the power of
forgiveness.
2
History
of
the
United
Nations,
UNITED
NATIONS,
https://www.un.org/en/aboutun/history/ (last visited May 2, 2014).
3
David Carment & Dane Rowlands, Three’s Company: Evaluating Third Party
Intervention in Intrastate Conflict. 42 J. OF CONFLICT RESOL 572, 574 (1998).
4
Intrastate conflict is broadly classified as sustained, armed conflict occurring
within state boundaries in which there are at least 200 fatalities; it has a lower
fatality threshold than war. Intrastate conflict typically arises between one or more
contenders who define themselves using communal criteria, and make claims on
behalf of the group’s collective ethnic, religious, ideological, or political interests
against the state. See Patrick M. Regan, Conditions of Successful Third-Party
Intervention in Intrastate Conflict. 40 J. OF CONFLICT RESOL 337, 338 (1996).
5
Sexual violence is one example of unconventional weapons used in intrastate
conflict. See Jennifer Park, Sexual Violence as a Weapon of War in International
Humanitarian Law, 3 INT’L PUB POL’Y REV 13 (2007), available at
http://www.ucl.ac.uk/ippr/journal/downloads/vol3-1/Park.pdf.
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intervention,6 Instead, intrastate conflict requires a different
approach to conflict resolution; it requires an approach that is rooted
in restorative justice.
What is it about civil conflict that makes it so difficult to
resolve with conventional conflict resolution means? At the heart of
the ethnic, religious, ideological or political motives guiding
intrastate conflict lays interpersonal conflict between neighbors.7
Strategic NATO bombing or United Nations peacekeeping missions
simply do not have the mandate to try to resolve conflict on that
interpersonal level.8 Practices of restorative justice are better able to
resolve the interpersonal conflicts that characterize intrastate conflict
because they involve and empower the parties who are in conflict.
For example, a truth and reconciliation commission (TRC) can give
victims, offenders, and the local community a greater sense of
ownership over their own conflict resolution process by promoting
forgiveness and creating a forum for truth telling.9 In ideal terms,
TRC processes offer parties hope for the effective resolution of their
conflict. In practice, truth and reconciliation are not always effective
or even possible, especially when the parties to the conflict are not
yet ready to reconcile or when a cultural preference to forget impedes
truth telling.10
In order to analyze the use and effectiveness of TRCs, it is
necessary to examine several key questions. First, how does the
philosophy of restorative justice shape the practice of truth and
reconciliation? Second, what do TRCs do: what are their key
features; when should they be implemented? Third, what are the

6

Ronald Fisher, Methods of Third Party Intervention, BERGDORF HANDBK. FOR
CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION 23 (2001), available at http://www.berghoffoundation.org/fileadmin/redaktion/Publications/Handbook/Articles/fisher_hb.pd
f.
7
Michael et al., Retributive and Restorative Justice, 32 LAW AND HUM. BEHAV.
375, 384 (2008).
8
Fisher, supra note 6, at 6.
9
Rosalind Shaw, Rethinking Truth and Reconciliation Commissions: Lessons
from
Sierra
Leone,
U.
S.
INST.
OF
PEACE
1,
http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/sr130.pdf (last visited Apr. 3, 2015).
10
Id.
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most important lessons from past TRCs, such as those used in South
Africa, and Rwanda? Fourth, what recommended role should TRCs
play in the resolution of future intrastate conflict? While the theory
of truth and reconciliation arises from the constructive idea of
restoring justice, it is clear that the practice of reconciliation is
complex, and it is very difficult to evaluate whether reconciliation
has been achieved.11 Regardless of those challenges, truth telling and
reconciliation are valuable practices that can help resolve some
aspects of conflict by facilitating healing.
THE PHILOSOPHY OF RESTORATIVE JUSTICE
Restorative justice is an alternative to the retributive approach
to justice through punishment.12 Restorative justice offers an
alternative framework in which the owners of the conflict
themselves, the offenders, victims, and communities are empowered
to resolve their own conflict.13 In other words, restorative justice
involves the direct participation of the affected parties in the process
of resolving the conflict.14 Unlike retributive justice that emphasizes
punishment as a means of righting wrongs, restorative justice
empowers the parties themselves to restore justice by alternative
means.15 At the core of restorative justice is a dialogical triad
between victim, offender, and the community, all of whom ‘own’ the
conflict.16 As part of a restorative process offenders are encouraged17
to accept accountability for the harm they caused (as well as its
11

T. A. Borer, Reconciling South Africa or South Africans? Cautionary Notes
from the TRC, 8 AFR STUD. Q. 19, 20 (2004).
12
Wenzel, supra, note 7, at 375-76.
13
Id.
14
Id.
15
Paul McCold, Restorative Justice: The Role of Community, INT’L INST. FOR
RESTORATIVE
PRACS.
(1995),
available
at
http://www.irrp.edu/article.detail.php?article id=NTA1.
16
Id.
17
Wenzel’s use of the phrase ‘offenders are made to accept accountability’ is
problematic because it contradicts the spirit of restorative justice. The offender
should not be made to apologize, but rather, should be empowered to recognize his
wrong, and should choose to apologize to the victim as an equal.
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repair), show remorse, and offer an apology; victims are encouraged
to overcome their resentment and offer forgiveness.18 The
community may include the family members of the offender, and
family members of the victim, both of whom play an important,
though amorphous role in the restorative justice process. 19 The
precise role of the community will vary, but it is clear that
communities need a mechanism to recover from the psychological
injury caused by the conflict; “that mechanism involves rituals of
forgiveness and release from anger.”20 Community involvement is a
critical pillar of the restorative justice triad because empowering
local communities to respond to their own conflicts meets the needs
of the offender and victim to heal the psychological injury and anger
created by the conflict, and helps to nurture responsible stewardship
of conflict resolution processes.21
Restorative justice can therefore be characterized as a process
rooted in dialogue between the parties involved in a conflict, and
their community.22 Through dialogue, both the victim and the
offender are given a voice to express their views and emotions, and
together with the community, establish a shared understanding of the
harm the offense has done and the values it violated.23 Some scholars
suggest that justice is restored when the offender takes responsibility
for his actions by expressing a sincere apology to the victim and the
community, and the victim offers forgiveness to the offender.24 More
generally, justice may be restored when the social equilibrium that

18

Wenzel, supra note 7, at 377.
In a statewide conflict such as Apartheid in South Africa, and the genocide in
Rwanda, the community may also include the society as a whole. The precise role
of the society at large in a restorative justice process is too nuanced to address here.
However, there will be a ‘trickle up’ effect in which smaller scale, communitybased restorative justice initiatives influence the restoration of justice in the society
at-large.
20
McCold, supra note 15,.
21
Id.
22
Id.
23
Wenzel, supra note 7, at 378.
24
Id.
19
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was damaged by the offense is restored through social action.25 The
goal of restorative justice is thus to bring together the estranged
victim, offender, and community and restore the original trust among
those parties.26 Punishment, in the form of legal adjudication or
informal revenge is noticeably absent from the restorative approach
to justice.27
The philosophy of restoring justice through dialogue is an
integral component of any truth and reconciliation commission.
Indeed, the idea of “dialogic morality” established by restorative
justice is essential for truth and reconciliation.28 Arising out of the
philosophy of Habermas’ discourse ethics, ‘dialogic morality’
suggests that morality is a social product, established through
dialogue between members of an interdependent community.29 The
practice of truth and reconciliation hinges on a social construction of
morality, in which communities construct a shared understanding of
right and wrong by engaging in dialogue.30 Unlike retributive
practices in which the offender is punished for harming the victim,
TRCs involve the victim, offender, and the local community in the
process of restoring justice in the shared community. TRCs embrace
the restorative justice perspective that offenses are conflicts that
rightfully belong to the victim and the offender.31 Because the victim
and the offender are the ‘owners’ of the conflict, the involvement of
criminal justice institutions and the imposition of legal remedies can
“rob the parties of their opportunity, right, and duty to learn and grow
through their conflicts.”32 To avoid this loss of opportunity, TRCs
harness the restorative justice process “whereby all the parties with a
stake in a particular offense come together to resolve collectively
25

Jennifer J. Llewellyn & Robert Howse, Institutions for Restorative Justice: The
South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 49 U. TORONTO L.J. 355, 357
(1999).
26
McCold, supra note 15.
27
Id.
28
Wenzel, supra note 7, at 380.
29
Id.
30
Id.
31
Id. at 377.
32
Id.
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how to deal with the aftermath of the offense and its implications for
the future.”33
The guiding principles and practices of restorative justice
provide a strong foundation for TRCs. The philosophy of engaging
the victim and offender in dialogue in order to construct a shared
understanding of the conflict, and to resolve collectively how to deal
with the aftermath of the offense is central to the work of TRCs.34
Indeed, TRCs focus on the restorative principle of healing parties
involved in a conflict, rather than punishing the offenders. TRCs
draw from restorative practices to promote more meaningful and
constructive ‘punishments’35 that oblige the offender to do something
for the victim, provide some service to the community, or take part
in an education program.36 TRCs also draw from the philosophy of
restorative justice to justify the use of amnesty as a way to encourage
offenders to participate in the dialogical processes of restoring justice
and reconciling parties in conflict.37 In principle, granting amnesty to
offenders is compatible with the philosophy of healing rather than
punishing.38 Amnesty can also be an essential tool in getting
offenders, as well as victims to the table to begin a process of
dialoguing. In reality, the idea of amnesty raises a serious question
about the degree to which TRCs facilitate restoring justice through
truth and reconciliation, or whether TRCs merely facilitate

33

Id.
Wenzel, supra note 7, at 380.
35
The term punishment, in reference to the consequence reached by the restorative
process, is problematic. It is only used here to juxtapose the idea of the outcome
of retributive processes, which do produce punishments, and restorative processes,
which do not emphasis punishment.
36
Wenzel, supra note 7, at 377.
37
TRCs may provide one of three types of amnesty: Blanket, limited or
conditional amnesty. Blanket amnesty absolves perpetrators of liability for all
crimes; limited amnesty may only apply to certain people, certain crimes, or certain
time periods; conditional amnesty requires an application and testimony. See Truth
and Reconciliation Commissions: Core Elements, THE PUB. INT’L LAW AND
POLICY
GRP.17
(May
2013),
http://syriaaccountability.org/wpcontent/uploads/PILPG-Truth-and-Reconciliation-Memo-2012_EN.pdf.
38
Id.
34

36.2Restoring Justice: Reconcilliation In South Africa and
Rwanda
27
forgetting.39 In order to unpack the amnesty dilemma, as well as the
other challenges of truth and reconciliation, it is useful to examine
the features of TRCs more closely.
TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSIONS
ORIGINS OF TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION
TRCs emerged in the late twentieth century in response to the
growing influence of restorative justice, and the challenges of dealing
with conflict in transitional societies. While retributive justice called
for criminal prosecution of offenses by war crimes tribunals, TRCs
offered a restorative approach to justice.40 Through a restorative
approach TRCs offered a way to address crimes and offenses in the
country’s past through a process aimed at determining what
happened, and why, in order to rebuild social bonds, rather than
punishing guilty individuals.41
Since 1973, more than 30 ‘commissions of inquiry’ and ‘truth
and reconciliation commissions’ have been established in order to
facilitate restorative justice in a variety of conflicts.42 Many of these

39

Sierra Leone illustrates the problems inherent in the contradictory practices of
‘truth telling’ and ‘forgetting.’ Despite pressure from NGOs and human rights
activists for a TRC in Sierra Leone, there was little popular support for such a
commission because most ordinary people preferred a ‘forgive and forget’
approach, a particular kind of memory practice that was deeply ingrained in the
culture of Sierra Leone. The TRC in Sierra Leone set itself in opposition to
widespread local practices of social forgetting by validating verbally discursive
remembering as the only road to reconciliation and peace. See Shaw, supra note 9.
40
Id.
41
Llewelyn, supra note 25, at 357.
42
Uganda (1974, 1986-1995), Paraguay (1976), Bolivia (1982-1984), Argentina
(1983-1984), Uruguay (1985), Zimbabwe (1985), Brazil (1986), Chile (19901991), Chad (1991-1992), El Salvador (1992-1993), Rwanda (1999), Honduras
(1993), Ethiopia (1993-2000), Germany (1992-1994), South Africa (1995), Haiti
(1995-1996), Guatemala (1997-1999), Nigeria (1999), Sierra Leone (1999), East
Timor (1999-2000). Kevin Avruch & Beatriz Vejarano, Truth and Reconciliation
Commissions: A Review Essay and Annotated Bibliography, 2 SOCIAL JUSTICE:
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commissions were created as transitional governments in newly
emerging, fragile democracies struggled to account for the violence,
crimes, and civil and human rights violations of previous regimes.43
Those regimes faced strong pressure from within, and from the
international community to follow the tradition of prosecuting war
crimes established at Nuremburg.44 Indeed, criminal trials cater to a
powerful “moral intuition, especially that of the outside spectators to
the conflict, that the ‘monsters’ responsible for the acts in questions
must be punished.”45 In response to that pressure, criminal tribunals
were established to deal with many intrastate conflicts, most notably
in Rwanda, and the former Yugoslavia.46 However, the desire to
prosecute is a retributive desire. Critics of retributive justice such as
Hannah Arendt argue that retributive prosecution does not foster
social reconciliation or healing.47 TRCs offer an alternative way to
deal with the past, and address the most difficult questions that arise
as a result of conflict.48 Should human rights violators be punished
or forgiven? Is amnesty permissible and necessary in the interest of
peace, reconciliation, and unity? How can the victims of human
rights violations be assisted to have their dignity restored? Should
history be ignored or acknowledged? TRCs provide a way to address
those complex questions.
WHAT DO TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSIONS DO?
TRCs emerged in response to the limitations of war crimes
tribunals to address the needs of the victims who were looking for

ANTHROPOLOGY, PEACE AND HUMAN RIGHTS 37 (2002), available at
http://humiliationstudies.org/documents/AvruchTRC.pdf.
43
Id.
44
Id.
45
Llewelyn, supra note 25, at 358.
46
See International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, UNITED NATIONS,
http://www.unictr.org/en/tribunal (last visited Apr. 3, 2015); see also International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, UNITED NATIONS,
http://www.icty.org/sections/AbouttheICTY (last visited Apr. 3, 2015).
47
Llewelyn, supra note 25, at 358.
48
Id.
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healing, rather than punishment of perpetrators.49 In order to foster
healing, TRCs reject the objectivity and neutrality favored by
criminal tribunals, and created forums for truth telling that make
space for the subjective and emotional dimension of being
victimized.50 Truth plays a central role in the healing process, and in
the restoration of justice for both victims and offenders. 51 For
victims, truth telling enables the victims to know the whole truth
about the crimes they suffered, and the reasons behind those crimes,
and to have their suffering publicly acknowledged.52 For the
offenders, and the affected community, truth telling reveals the
circumstances surrounding and reasons for the violations.53 Truth
telling is therefore essential for effective healing, which is the central
purpose of truth and reconciliation. However, TRCs also serve a
parallel purpose.
In addition to, and in conjunction with, the creation of a
forum for healing, TRCs also establish an independent, temporary
commission of inquiry that investigates and reports on patterns of
abuses of human rights or humanitarian law committed during
determined periods of time.54 TRCs thus make recommendations for
redressing human rights violations committed during periods of
conflict, and preventing the repetition of human rights violations in
the future.55 It is important that TRCs investigate abuses and make
those recommendations from a restorative justice standpoint, rather
than for the purpose of retributive prosecution.
In order to maintain that distinction, and do restorative rather
than retributive work, TRCs are usually constructed according to
several common core elements: legitimacy drawn from consultation
with the public, neutrality of personnel, a tailored mandate, adequate
resources and funding, and the power to fulfill the objectives of the
49
50
51
52
53
54
55

Id.
Id.
Id.
Llewelyn, supra note 25, at 356.
Id.
MARK FREEMAN, TRUTH COMMISSIONS AND PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS 11 (2006).
Llewelyn, supra note 25, at 368.
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commission through specific activities and recommendations.56
Scholars have further specified that the legitimacy of a TRC’s policy
has three conditions for efficacy; the truth must be known; the policy
must represent the people’s will; and the policy must abide by
international human rights norms.57 The first and third criteria are
widely accepted, and often achieved by most TRCs, but the condition
that the policy coincide with the will of the people is often more
difficult to achieve.58 When these core elements and conditions are
present, the practice of truth and reconciliation has the potential to
facilitate an objective investigation of offenses, while helping
victims and offenders share their subjective truths about their
experiences in conflict. TRCs thus have the potential to transform
conflict by providing a public platform for victims and offenders to
share their personal stories, and can facilitate public debate about
how to come to terms with the past.59 By engaging the nation in a
discourse of truth telling, TRCs can help parties to intrastate conflict
heal their wounds, and restore justice.
WHEN SHOULD TRUTH
IMPLEMENTED?

AND

RECONCILIATION COMMISSIONS

BE

In an ideal form, TRCs represent a powerful restorative tool;
in reality TRCs are not immune to circumstances that limit their
potential benefits.60 “Weak civil society, political instability, victim
and witness fears about testifying, a weak or corrupt justice system,
insufficient time to carry out investigations, lack of public support,
and inadequate funding” all threaten to undermine the effectiveness
of a TRC.61 Critics of TRCs also ask, “does anyone really know that
56

Id.
Jeremy Sarkin, The Necessity and Challenges of Establishing a Truth and
Reconciliation Commission in Rwanda, 21 HUM. RIGHTS Q. 767, 804 (1999).
58
Id.
59
Report of the Secretary-General, The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in
Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies. U.N. SEC. COUNCIL 17 (2004),
http://www.unrol.org/files/2004%20report.pdf (last visited Apr. 3, 2015).
60
Id.
61
Id.
57
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truth commissions secure the benefits of healing, catharsis,
disclosure of truth, and national reconciliation?”62 These challenges
raise several difficult questions: When should a TRC be formed in
order to promote healing and restore justice to a society in conflict?
How should the effectiveness or success of a TRC be measured? Can
a TRC be effective if it is implemented amidst significant political
instability? Can a TRC have the legitimacy, neutrality, authority, or
resources to facilitate effective restorative dialogue, if the transitional
government does not yet have authority or legitimacy? Similarly,
can dialogue be effective if the victims and offenders are afraid to
testify because of ongoing conflict?
It is unlikely that a TRC would be effective in such situations;
therefore it would be best to implement a TRC after issues of political
instability and fear have been resolved. But when precisely can a
TRC be implemented effectively? At what point during the process
of resolving conflict is truth and reconciliation possible? Despite the
uncertainty of knowing when to implement a TRC, proponents of
restorative justice argue that the practice of truth and reconciliation
has tremendous potential to help parties to intrastate conflict
transition toward peace. Lessons from South Africa and Rwanda
help illustrate the tremendous potential of TRCs as a restorative tool,
as well as the challenges of truth telling, and balancing retributive
and restorative justice initiatives.
TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION IN SOUTH AFRICA
ORIGINS
The context out of which the South African Commission of
Truth and Reconciliation (hereafter the ‘South African TRC’)
emerged provides many useful lessons regarding reconciliation
during a period of substantial political change. The apartheid system
of institutionalized racism fueled intrastate conflict between white

62

Borer, supra note 11, at 20.
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Afrikaner settlers, and black South Africans from 1948 to 1990.63
Following a period of international economic and diplomatic
pressure, the government under F.W. De Klerk agreed to negotiate
with the African National Congress party, led by Nelson Mandela in
order to negotiate a transition away from the Apartheid system.64 In
1994, following that period of negotiation, democratic elections were
held, and an interim constitution was passed that legally ended the
system of Apartheid.65 In 1995, the newly elected Government of
National Unity, led by Nelson Mandela, set up the South African
TRC with the mandate to “investigate gross human rights violations
that were perpetrated by both state and liberation movements during
the period of the Apartheid regime, including abductions, killings,
and torture, to allow victims to tell their stories, to grant a historical
record of the past, to grant amnesty where appropriate, and to draft a
reparations policy.”66
To accomplish that mandate, the South African TRC was
divided into three committees; the Human Rights Violations
Committee, the Amnesty Committee, and the Reparations and
Rehabilitation Committee.67 The Amnesty Committee of the TRC
was empowered to grant amnesty to perpetrators who confessed their
crimes truthfully and completely to the commission, but the TRC
also recommended that prosecution be considered in cases where
amnesty was denied.68 The TRC heard testimony from
approximately 22,000 victims, received approximately 7,000
amnesty applications, and granted amnesty in approximately 1,000.69
The final report of the TRC was fully endorsed by the government,

63

Truth
Commission:
South
Africa,
U.S.
INST.
OF
PEACE,
http://www.usip.org/publications/truth-commission-south-africa (last visited Apr.
6, 2015).
64
Id.
65
Id.
66
Id.
67
Id.
68
Truth Commission: South Africa, supra note 63.
69
Id.
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and President Nelson Mandela apologized to all victims on behalf of
the state.70
CORE ELEMENTS
For many scholars, the South African TRC is considered
effective because it met the core elements and conditions that
facilitate truth and reconciliation.71 The South African TRC had
legitimacy, or at least the illusion of legitimacy because it was
established by a democratically elected government, and more
importantly, because it drew legitimacy from an “exceptional degree
of public participation.”72 Mandela made an effort to keep the
commissioners neutral by appointing a committee to oversee a public
nomination, selection, and interview process, and encouraged civil
society groups to make nominations.73 The commissioners selected
for the TRC included both men and women, and came from a range
of backgrounds, and different parts of South Africa, although whites
were over-represented.74 The mandate was clear, and was based on
the normative idea that “a complete and truthful disclosure of past
human rights abuses can guarantee lasting reconciliation.”75 The
TRC commissioners were given considerable power, discretion, and
resources to do their work, and did ultimately produce a substantial
3,500 page final report that included recommendations for the
future.76
IMPLEMENTATION

70

Id.
Truth and Reconciliation Commissions: Core Elements, supra note 37.
72
Sarkin, supra note 57, at 804.
73
University of Witwatersrand, Truth and Reconciliation Commission
Background, TRACES OF TRUTH, http://truth.wwl.wits.ac.za/cat_descr.php?cat=1
(last visited Apr. 06, 2015).
74
Id.
75
Borer, supra note 11, at 22.
76
Id. at 28.
71
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The South African TRC was implemented at an opportune
time when the factors that can undermine implementation were in the
process of being resolved.77 Some of the factors that can undermine
the effective implementation of a TRC include weak civil society,
political instability, victim and witness fears about testifying, a weak
or corrupt justice system, insufficient time to carry out investigations,
lack of public support, and inadequate funding.78 The South Africa
TRC was implemented in 1995, one year after Mandela became
President in the first democratic election in South African history.
Although civil society, political stability, and judicial institutions
were still weak, they were undergoing a period of transformation, and
were significantly more stable and viable than they had been under
the Apartheid system.79 More significantly, the public support for
truth and reconciliation was very strong.80 The South African TRC
was largely effective because it was implemented at a timely moment
when there was substantial support in favor of truth and
reconciliation from civil society institutions and the general public.81
SUCCESS
It is clear that the South African TRC was implemented at a
good time, and that it met the core elements of an ideal TRC.
Effective implementation of the core elements of truth and
reconciliation implies some degree of success, but it does not
guarantee successful reconciliation from a restorative standpoint.82
To judge the success of the South African TRC it is necessary to
consider whether it fulfilled a restorative justice purpose. Proponents
of the South African TRC suggest that it did facilitate restorative
justice by enabling perpetrators to relieve themselves of the burden
of guilt by disclosing the truth, enabled families of victims and
survivors to discover the truth, and facilitated the process of “healing
77
78
79
80
81
82

University of Witwatersrand, supra note, 73.
Report of the Secretary-General, supra note 59, at ¶ 51.
University of Witwatersrand, supra note 73.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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the wounds of the past, and transforming anger and grief into
understanding, thereby creating the climate essential for
reconciliation and reconstruction.”83 In other words, the South
African TRC created opportunities for dialogue between victims,
offenders, and community members, and thus facilitated the
construction of a shared understanding of the conflict, and a shared
morality.84 Much of that dialogue occurred through storytelling,
which victims described as a healing and therapeutic process.85 That
emphasis on dialogue and ownership of the reconciliation process by
the parties themselves is indicative of a restorative justice purpose.
Proponents of truth and reconciliation process in South Africa point
to the use of storytelling as evidence of the TRC’s ultimate success
as a restorative justice endeavor.86
Critics of the South African TRC argue that the TRC did not
successfully achieve the lofty goal of restorative justice because it
confused justice with therapy.87 Human Rights Watch criticized the
South African TRC’s use of amnesty as “condoning major
justifications for the repression and violence committed by the
apartheid state.”88 The South African TRC, and TRC’s in general,
have also been criticized for constructing selective historical records
that merely reflect compromises and concessions made in the name
of transitional progress.89 These criticisms raise two serious
questions. Does truth telling actually achieve the transformative,
healing ‘dialogic morality’ advocated by restorative justice? Does
truth telling involve the kind of dialogue that that is necessary to
achieve reconciliation? The answer to both questions is no. Truth
telling implies that each party has the opportunity to tell their truth,
but it does not necessarily involve dialogue between parties, nor does
83

Borer, supra note 11, at 22.
Id.
85
Borer, supra note 11, at 24.
86
Id.
87
Bronwyn Leebaw, Legitimation or Judgment? South Africa’s Restorative
Approach to Transitional Justice, 36 POLITY 23, 46 (2003).
88
Id. at 47.
89
Id.
84
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it necessarily lead to reconciliation. In the South African case, critics
argue that by offering offenders amnesty in exchange for truth
telling, the TRC pursued truth at the expense of restorative dialogue
and reconciliation, and thus created a false sense of reconciliation.90
At the time the South African government established the
TRC, the government argued that amnesty was necessary in order to
achieve the difficult, sensitive, even agonizing balancing act between
the need to provide justice to victims of past abuses, and the need for
reconciliation and rapid transition to a new future.”91 The South
African government sought to limit the use of amnesty by passing
legislation outlining the measures and procedures of the amnesty
process, including linking amnesty to specific criteria such as full
disclosure.92 However, the practice of granting amnesty in exchange
for truth telling remained highly controversial.93 “Many victims and
survivors opposed the granting of amnesty because it allowed the
offender to choose to disclose selectively, about the specific matter
for which the individual was applying for amnesty.” 94 Victims and
scholars alike criticize the practice of allowing limited disclosure in
exchange for amnesty because it frustrated the South African TRCs
ability to fulfill its mandate to ‘establish as complete a picture as
possible.”95 It is plausible to suggest that the South African TRC
would not have achieved as much as it did without the use of
amnesty. Nevertheless, there is a nuanced distinction between the
kind of reconciliation achieved when victims, offenders, and the
community participate in full, honesty truth telling, followed by
apology and forgiveness, versus reconciliation achieved when the
government grants offenders amnesty for limited disclosures.96
Reconciliation through amnesty lacks catharsis for the victims and
90
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the community, and is thus not as restorative as reconciliation
achieved through meaningful dialogue.97
The use of amnesty to reconcile parties highlights one of the
central problems with the South African TRC. The amorphous idea
of reconciliation plagued the South African effort to resolve the
conflict.98 Despite the widespread use of the term ‘reconciliation’ by
the TRC, it was never clearly defined, nor was the image of what
reconciliation would look like in the minds of different parties after
the truth telling process.99 One of the central problems regarding
reconciliation in the South African case was the emergence of two
contrary forms of reconciliation, and the failure of the TRC to clarify
the distinction between the two models of reconciliation.100 The TRC
sought to promote a religious concept of ‘interpersonal
reconciliation’ between victims and perpetrators by creating a forum
for truth telling, and facilitating interpersonal dialogue leading to
apology.101 However, the South African TRC also pursued a political
form of reconciliation, ‘national unity and reconciliation’, which was
more concerned with reconciliation on an institutional level.102
Twenty years is likely too short a period to judge the success
of the South African TRC in terms of interpersonal or national
reconciliation; however, there is evidence to suggest that it did
succeed to a limited degree on both levels. There are powerful stories
of interpersonal reconciliation between victims and perpetrators, as
in the case of the widow who found out through the TRC process that
her activist husband had been kidnapped and killed;103 after the
hearing she declared, “don’t we want peace for South Africa? How
are we going to find peace if we don’t forgive?”104
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There are other stories of victims unwilling or unable to
achieve reconciliation with perpetrators. For example, one mother
proclaimed that she would never forgive the police officers that killed
her child; “I want to see them dead, like our children.”105 Despite
substantial challenges and shortcomings, it t is clear that the South
African TRC did facilitate healing for some parties, especially those
who were able to forgive and apologize, and thus successfully
facilitated restorative justice at the interpersonal level.106 The South
African TRC also achieved a degree of successful restorative justice
at the national level by dismantling the institutional structures that
made human rights violations in South Africa not only possible but
inevitable.107 If reconciliation in South Africa is measured in the
absolute terms, the success of the South African TRC is limited. If,
on the other hand, reconciliation is viewed as a cycle, an ongoing
process of dialogue about the past that achieved some degree of
healing for some participants, the South Africa TRC did achieve
success from the restorative justice standpoint.
LESSONS
There are many lessons to draw from the South African
endeavor to pursue truth and reconciliation. First, it is important to
implement a TRC after some political stability has been established,
preferably by a democratic election, which will give a TRC greater
legitimacy. Second, it is important to ensure that truth telling
involves actual dialogue between offenders, victims, and the
community in pursuit of reconciliation; it is problematic to grant
amnesty. Third, it is important to define reconciliation as precisely
as possible, and to distinguish interpersonal reconciliation and
national reconciliation. Although South Africa struggled to find the
right approach to truth and reconciliation, and continues to struggle
to live peacefully with the past, the South African TRC represents a
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model for the tremendous potential of TRCs as a tool of restorative
justice.
TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION IN RWANDA
Both South Africa and Rwanda illustrate the challenges
facing countries emerging from periods of great political turmoil,
particularly turmoil associated with gross violation of human
rights.108 However, Rwanda illustrates the particular challenges of
pursuing truth and reconciliation after genocide.109 “How does a
society return to any sort of normality when two neighbors living side
by side are, respectively, victim and perpetrator of heinous crimes?110
Rwanda also illustrates the problems inherent in pursing retributive
justice in a criminal court before restorative truth and reconciliation,
and the complexity of using pseudo-judicial community-based
Gacaca Courts to carry out restorative justice.111
ORIGINS
After a period of mounting tensions, hostilities erupted in
Rwanda in October 1990, when the Tutsi Rwandan Patriotic Front
(RPF) invaded Rwanda from Uganda in an effort to overthrow the
Hutu-run government.112 In response to the invasion, governmentcontrolled forces attacked minority Tutsi populations and moderate
Hutus; in turn, the RPF attacked Hutu civilians.113 A ceasefire
agreement was reached in July 1992, and the civil war officially
ended on August 4, 1993 with the signing of the Arusha Accords.114

108

Borer, supra note 36, at 20; see also Truth Commission: Rwanda 99, U.S. INST.
PEACE, http://www.usip.org/publications/truth-commission-rwanda-99 (last
visited Apr. 29, 2014).
109
Sarkin, supra note 57, at 767.
110
Id.
111
Id.
112
Truth Commission: Rwanda 99, supra note 108.
113
Id.
114
Id.
OF

40

JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW & POLICY

Vol. 36.2

Despite the efforts of domestic and international diplomats to
negotiate a power sharing agreement between Hutus and Tutsis,
tensions persisted between those ethnic factions.115 In the spring of
1994, the Tutsi Rwandan Patriotic Front (PRF) invaded Rwanda
from Uganda, and shot down a plane carrying President
Habyarimana, the Hutu president of Rwanda.116 In retaliation for that
perceived assassination, Hutu extremists launched their plans to
destroy the entire Tutsi population, and initiated a genocide in which
an estimated 500,000 to 1,000,000 people were killed over 100
days.117 The victims of the genocide were mostly Tutsis, although
Hutus who had demonstrated support for governmental power
sharing between Tutsis and Hutus were also targeted.118
The Arusha agreement of 1993 had established the mandate
for a Commission of Inquiry and a National Commission on Human
Rights to investigate human rights violations committed by all parties
in Rwanda during the civil war.119 However, because of the
intervening violence, a formal truth and reconciliation commission
was not established until 1999, when the new Transitional National
Assembly established the Rwandan National Unity and
Reconciliation Commission (NURC).120
The newly elected
government of national unity established the NURC with a mandate
to “organize national public debates aimed at promoting
reconciliation, foster tolerance and a culture of peace and human
rights, denounce any ideas aimed at disunity, draft laws to foster
reconciliation, and monitor whether authorities and the people in
general ‘respected and observed the policy of national unity and
reconciliation.’121 In November 2002, the NURC was established as
a permanent organ of the government of Rwanda. ** A council of
twelve Rwandan commissioners who form an Executive Committee,
and a permanent secretariat with three departments, the Department
115
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of Civic Education, the Department of Peace Building, and Conflict
Management, and the Department of Administration and Finance
now staffs it.122 The NURC has not yet issued a final report, but did
publish reports from 2000-2001 on reconciliation activities.123 In one
such report, the NURC reported that:
Rwandans discovered, to their surprise, that the ethnic
differences, which have been so much magnified in the past, are not
the real differences. The issue in Rwanda was bad governance, the
culture of impunity and social injustices by successive ruling cliques.
These have affected almost every Rwandan in one way or another.124
From a restorative justice standpoint, the establishment of the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) by the United
Nations Security Council in November 1994 significantly
complicated prospects for reconciliation in Rwanda.125 Between
January 1997 and December 2012, the ICTR completed the trial
phase of its mandate by prosecuting 92 people indicted for
genocide.126 The ICTR produced several significant retributive
judgments. The tribunal issued the first judgment by an international
court on genocide in a decision convicting mayor Jean-Paul Akayesu
of nine counts of genocide and crimes against humanity. 127 The
ICTR’s conviction of Prime Minister Jean Kambanda also constitutes
the first time a head of government has been convicted for the crime
of genocide.128 The ICTR continued to do important retributive work
until 2014, when a new Mechanism for International Criminal
Tribunals took over the remaining tasks of the ICTR.129 An analysis
of the retributive work of the ICTR is beyond the scope of this paper;
122
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however, it is important to consider the impact of a simultaneous,
parallel process of retributive justice on attempts to carry out
restorative justice through truth and reconciliation in Rwanda.
CORE ELEMENTS
The complex and particularly tragic nature of the conflict in
Rwanda raised many questions about how best to resolve tensions
among the parties to the conflict.130 Proponents of retributive justice
argue that prosecution is necessary in order to bring the violators of
human rights to justice, and to hold them accountable for their
particularly egregious crimes.131 However, critics of retributive
justice argue that criminal prosecution resulting in retributive
punishment can be ineffective in fragile democracies where new
regimes may not be able to survive the destabilizing effects of
politically charged trials.132 In lieu of potentially destabilizing
retributive trials, proponents of restorative justice argue that the
practice of truth and reconciliation can be more effective in helping
parties transition toward peaceful resolution of conflict.133 This was
certainly the ideal goal of the Rwandan NURC when it was
established in 1999. When implemented, the NURC was confronted
with the challenge of reconciling a profoundly divided population
without certain core elements and conditions that support effective
reconciliation.
As previously identified, the core elements of a TRC include
legitimacy drawn from consultation with the public, neutrality of
personnel, a tailored mandate, adequate resources and funding, and
the power to fulfill the objectives of the commission through specific
activities and recommendations.134
Scholars have further
enumerated three conditions of legitimacy that are necessary for a
130
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TRC to work effectively: the truth must be known, the policy of the
TRC must represent the people’s will, and the policy must abide by
international human rights norms.135 In Rwanda, the NURC’s
tailored mandate, the power, and resources available to the
commission are not in dispute.136 The central problems in Rwanda
are a lack of legitimacy, neutrality, and lack of popular support.137
The government undermined the legitimacy of the NURC by failing
to appoint neutral commissioners and thus alienated the public
will.138
In order for a TRC to be legitimate, it is important for
commissioners to be chosen from a “wide cross-section of society,
and not be perceived as one-sided or oriented to a certain outcome;
otherwise the commission will be considered biased and therefore
illegitimate.”139 Because of the ethnic component of the conflict in
Rwanda, the inclusion of all ethnic groups, including Hutus and
Tutsis, was vital to the legitimacy of the commission. Since the
overthrow of the Hutu government in 1994, Tutsis excluded Hutus
from positions of power, including positions on the NURC
commission.140 “It is not realistic to expect reconciliation as long as
an unelected minority rules. Majority rule must be respected.”141
Although Rwanda has tried to democratize by holding multiple
elections since 1994, those elections have been plagued by
corruption; democracy in Rwanda remains elusive today.142 The
government continues to demonstrate a lack of interest in
establishing a broad base of support.143 A lack of popular support for
the governments’ initiatives grew out of fundamentally different
objectives of the Tutsis and Hutus following the 1994 genocide.144
135
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“After 1994, the Tutsi wanted justice above all else, and the Hutu
wanted democracy.”145 Without democracy, power sharing, and the
inclusion of all ethnic groups in government, the government
sponsored truth and reconciliation commission lacked the legitimacy,
neutrality, and popular support to be effective.
IMPLEMENTATION
The lack of popular support for the government and the
NURC in Rwanda grew out of the government’s choice to pursue
retributive justice before restorative reconciliation.146 The timing of
the implementation of the NURC created a major obstacle to efforts
to achieve truth and reconciliation in Rwanda.147 The United Nations
established a criminal tribunal in 1994 to address the crimes
committed during the genocide, but the government of Rwanda did
not seek restorative justice by establishing the NURC until 1999.148
“For five years, the government of Rwanda refused to talk about
reconciliation until justice was achieved through retributive
means.”149 As a result of the emphasis the international community
and the Rwandan government placed on retributive justice, the
process of restorative reconciliation in Rwanda was significantly
compromised.150
The use of Gacaca Courts illustrates one of the ways in which
restorative justice was compromised in Rwanda. Historically, a
‘gacaca’ was a community-based informal arbitration convened by
the parties to a civil dispute to sit down and discuss an issue, with the
goal of achieving a settlement that was accepted by both parties.151
Post-genocide, the practice of gacaca was manifested in the
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formation of ‘Gacaca Courts’ in which hearings were held at weekly
meetings in villages across the country, often outdoors in
marketplace, or under a tree.152 The hearings achieved a restorative
purpose by giving victims, offenders and their communities a chance
to face each other and give evidence about what really happened
during the genocide and how it happened.153 However, the Gacaca
Courts confused that restorative purpose by using pseudo-legal
mechanisms and a retributive framework.154 Elected community
members lacking legal qualifications served as ‘judges’ and hear
cases.155 Approximately 65 percent of offenders were found guilty,
and sentenced to long jail sentences and hard labor.156 In contrast to
their historically conciliatory purpose, the Gacaca Courts became
forums for administering retributive punishments.157
Proponents of the Gacaca Courts argued that the courts
offered the best possible mechanism to achieve Rwanda’s
transitional justice goals because they coupled traditional
community-based justice processes with modern judicial
practices.158 However, critics argued that by prosecuting offenders
in a structure designed to achieve a restorative purpose, the Gacaca
Courts merely lowered the standard of justice, and scarified the
possibility of societal reconciliation.159 The government of Rwanda
constructed Gacaca Courts as a mechanism of reconciliation;
however they did not achieve reconciliation in a restorative sense.160
“Instead of healing the rift between Hutus and Tutsis, the operation
of the Gacaca Courts reinforced the rift by affirming the personas of
innocent or guilty, victim or perpetrator.161 The use of the Gacaca
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Courts merely reinforced the atmosphere of retribution that clouded
post-genocide efforts to restore peace in Rwanda.162
By establishing the ICTR first, the government of Rwanda set
a retributive tone that permeated all future efforts to resolve the
conflict. The ICTR pursued truth, and sought to acknowledge past
human rights abuses, but it did so in order to establish culpability and
punishments, rather than to open dialogue.163 The criminal trials held
in the Gacaca Courts aired the ‘truth’ about crimes committed during
the genocide, but did so in order to punish the offenders, rather than
to reconcile and heal the victims and the community. When the
NURC was finally established in 1999, the so-called truth about the
genocide had already been established, and the perpetrators already
punished; except it was truth according to the Tutsi victors, not the
real victims.164 “Those promulgating the genocide trials [were], for
the most part, not the same people whose families were killed during
the genocide.”165 From 1994 until 1999, the surviving victims of the
genocide were largely excluded from the retributive justice process
and lacked access to restorative options.166 Even after a restorative
outlet was established by the NURC, opening channels for dialogue
between offenders and victims, victims were confronted with the
challenge of telling truths that did not necessarily fit into the
previously constructed truth about the genocide.167 By seeking
retributive justice before restorative justice, Rwanda left victims
feeling unfulfilled by the retributive process and alienated from the
restorative process.
SUCCESS
When the work of the NURC is evaluated from a restorative
justice standpoint, the complexity of achieving successful truth and
reconciliation becomes evident. Rwandans have been working to
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move past the 1994 genocide for twenty years; however, the capacity
of the NURC to promote restorative dialogue and healing has been
quite limited.168 One problem is that the NURC has not produced a
final report, despite the fact that it has been functioning since 1999.169
The NURC did produce annual reports until 2001, and did draft a
history book for public schools aimed at reforming ethnic tensions
between Hutus and Tutsis.170 A final report, and recommendations
are only a small measure of the success of a TRC; however, the
absence of such products point to the inefficaciousness of the NURC.
Beyond that inefficiency, critics of the NURC argue that it has not
facilitated substantial justice, restorative or otherwise.171 That is
because the ICTR has controlled the process of collecting truths since
1994, and the forum created by the Gacaca Courts in 2001 muddled
the restorative justice process in Rwanda.172
The Gacaca Courts likely emerged to fill the void created by
the lack of opportunities for restorative justice under the NURC.173
However, instead of providing a parallel track to aid the work of the
NURC, the Gacaca Courts usurped power from the NURC to become
the centerpiece of Rwanda’s truth and reconciliation process. 174 The
work of the Gacaca Courts, rather than the NURC, should therefore
be evaluated in measuring the success of the truth and reconciliation
process in Rwanda in facilitating restorative justice.
In theory, the idea of the Gacaca Courts should have
successfully brought about reconciliation in a restorative sense.
“Gacaca required people within the communities to work together as
witnesses, tribunal personnel, and jurors, and in doing so replaced the
divisive experience of the genocide with the cohesive experience of
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securing justice.”175 This is certainly a restorative purpose, and
suggests that the Courts facilitated some successful reconciliation
from a restorative justice perspective, in the form of dialogue
between some victims and offenders.176 However, the retributive
model of the Gacaca Courts undermined their capacity to promote
healing or forgiveness, which are vital to the restoration of justice.177
The Gacaca Courts became an odd manifestation of inadequately
legal retributive justice pursued for an inadequately restorative
purpose.178 The Courts were set up to clear the backlog of hundreds
of thousands of people accused of involvement in the killings who
were awaiting prosecution at the ICTR.179
The Gacaca Courts certainly achieved results, however those
results look more like punishment than the healing advocated by
proponents of restorative justice.180 The Gacaca system could be
deemed a success from a restorative standpoint because it opened
channels for dialogue between victims, offenders, and communities
by creating opportunities for those parties to sit down and talk to one
another. Yet, it is unlikely that an offender would experience healing
if he or she enters into dialogue under threat of punishment. Victims
and community members may have experienced some restorative
healing thanks to the opportunity to participate in the Gacaca Courts;
however the Courts provided offenders very limited possibilities for
healing. Because the Courts imposed serious legal punishments
rather than forgiveness, they were not widely successful in achieving
restorative outcomes for complex genocide cases.181 Given the
decidedly retributive nature of the work by the Gacaca Courts, the
limited restorative work of the NURC, and the extensive retributive
work of the ICTR, it is evident that retributive justice rather than
restorative justice was more commonly achieved in Rwanda.
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LESSONS
Rwanda offers important lessons about the truth and
reconciliation process. It is vital for a TRC to include parties who
fairly represent the population, especially ethnic groups who are
parties to the conflict. It is also important for the TRC to draw
legitimacy from a democratically elected regime. However, the most
important lesson from Rwanda is the necessity of implementing a
clearly restorative truth and reconciliation process before
undertaking retributive punishment. Lessons from Rwanda reveal
the problem of pursing retribution before restorative justice, and
retribution in the guise of restorative justice.
LEARNING FROM THE PAST: LESSONS FROM SOUTH AFRICA AND
RWANDA
The practice of promoting truth and reconciliation in order to
achieve restorative justice is complex, but it is nevertheless a
worthwhile endeavor. In order to more effectively implement a TRC
and successfully achieve the healing that restorative justice can offer,
it is useful to draw lessons from South Africa and Rwanda. The most
important lessons from the South African and Rwandan conflicts can
be summarized broadly to include the following: democratization,
authentic dialogue, utilization of neither amnesty nor threat of
punishment, a restorative process clearly defined and distinguishable
from retributive justice, and restorative intervention at a moment
when the conflict is ripe for resolution.
Both cases illustrate the importance of democratization as the
first step toward restorative justice, and the formation of a legitimate
TRC. The need for truth and reconciliation often arise at a time when
a society is undergoing a significant political transition. The postapartheid period in South Africa illustrates the complex political
environment in which many restorative justice endeavors must
operate. As the South African example demonstrates, it is important
for the government establishing the TRC to be democratically

50

JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW & POLICY

Vol. 36.2

elected, and representative of the population, for a TRC to have the
legitimacy necessary to be effective,182
The restorative justice initiatives undertaken in South Africa
and Rwanda also illustrate the importance of dialogue in the truth
telling stage of the truth and reconciliation process. In order for truth
telling to create an opportunity for offenders, victims, and the
community to construct the ‘dialogic morality’ that lies at the heart
of restorative justice, it is necessary for truth telling to involve an
authentic dialogue between parties.183 It is important for the parties
involved in the conflict to actually be involved in that dialogue, and
not excluded because of their identity, or position as a victor or loser
of the conflict.184 One of the most challenging questions that any
TRC must address is ‘who is invited to the table?’ This was a
question asked in South Africa and in Rwanda. Only when all the
relevant parties in the conflict were invited to the table were South
Africans and Rwandans able to engage in effective reconciliation.
Another difficult question facing any community seeking to
implement restorative justice is whether perpetrators will be
completely forgiven, and crimes will be forgotten? South African
style amnesty is not the ideal way to promote that dialogue, nor is a
punitive Rwandan style ‘gacaca’ court the right forum in which to
hold restorative dialogue.185 Rather, the restorative justice endeavors
in South Africa and Rwanda illustrate the need for dialogue emerging
from authentic, inclusive interaction between all the parties involved
in the conflict (offenders, victims, and the community), without the
incentive of amnesty or the threat of punishment.186 Truth and
reconciliation does not successfully resolve conflict if all is forgotten
and the slate is wiped clean by amnesty, nor is conflict resolved if
perpetrators are punished after engaging in truth telling.
It is also important to have a clear idea and understanding of
the kind of reconciliation that parties are working toward, whether
182
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interpersonal or national reconciliation.187 Before a community can
effectively implement a TRC or similar restorative justice efforts,
they should understand the relationship between interpersonal and
national reconciliation, and the order in which each form will be
pursued. Interpersonal reconciliation between individuals is an
important part of the truth and reconciliation process, but it is
insufficient if not coupled with national reconciliation.188 Although
it may be difficult to define, it is important for all parties to
understand what constitutes reconciliation and which type of
reconciliation they are working toward, so that moments of
successful reconciliation at each level can be recognized and
celebrated.
In addition to distinguishing the type of reconciliation sought,
the restorative justice endeavors in South Africa and Rwanda reveal
the need to distinguish restorative versus retributive processes.189
The relationship between restorative and retributive processes is
highly complex, and is made more so by the occasional need to
employ both processes.190 Idealists may advocate for an entirely
restorative, healing approach, but pragmatists recognize that it may
be necessary to use both restorative and retributive processes in order
to help societies effectively move past conflict.
Most importantly, lessons from the truth and reconciliation
processes in South Africa and Rwanda reveal the importance of
timing and ripeness for effective conflict resolution.191 Restorative
justice practices do not work effectively when the conflict is not ripe
for resolution. In South Africa, the conflict only became ripe for truth
and reconciliation following the democratic election of Nelson
Mandela.192 In Rwanda, the moment of ripeness was delayed because
of ongoing violence, and did not fully manifest until a new
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transitional authority was in place.193 Future truth and reconciliation
endeavors should heed these lessons about ripeness carefully. If
democratization has not taken place, or conflict is ongoing, then a
formal truth and reconciliation initiative will likely be ineffective.
Societies in conflict must be ready to resolve the conflict before
victims can site down and engage in authentic dialogue with
perpetrators.
These lessons gathered from South Africa and Rwanda, two
of the most prominent examples of large-scale truth and
reconciliation processes, can provide useful insight into effective and
ineffective restorative justice strategies. Future truth and
reconciliation efforts should heed the lessons learned from these
restorative justice efforts in order to be successful.
CONCLUSION
A paradigm shift has occurred that has fundamentally
changed the nature of conflict in the 21st century. Conflict is no
longer predominantly a clash between states, but now involves highly
complex intrastate conflicts that harms individuals and causes
national discord. The complex nature of intrastate conflict requires a
new approach to conflict resolution. That approach is rooted in
restorative justice, which gives parties to a conflict ownership over
their own conflict resolution process. While lessons from South
Africa and Rwanda reveal significant challenges with the
implementation and use of truth and reconciliation commissions, the
phenomenon of truth and reconciliation has emerged out of the
restorative justice tradition to become a viable, and hopeful model
for effective conflict resolution. Nelson Mandela once said, “if you
want to make peace with your enemy, you have to work with your
enemy. Then he becomes your partner.”194 Restorative justice in the
form of truth and reconciliation offers a hopeful way to transform
enemies into partners and conflict into peace.
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